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FEDERAL COMMON LAW: JUDICIALLY ESTABLISHED 




The United States Supreme Court, in Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee,' revitalized the federal common law of nuisance by rul-
ing that certain suits alleging that water pollution created a public 
nuisance2 could be heard in federal courts on the basis of federal law . 
Although the Court did not reach the merits of Illinois' claim for 
relief, it outlined some considerations to guide courts deciding 
claims based on federal nuisance law. The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois which subsequently heard 
the case on its merits made its rulings under the principles of the 
federal common law of nuisance.3 The district court found that 
Milwaukee's sewage discharge into Lake Michigan did create a 
nuisance4 and ordered Milwaukee to comply with specific court-
established effluent standards. 5 The standards imposed by the 
court were nearly identical to those in effect under Illinois law for 
* Staff Member, BoSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW. 
I 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The case is discussed in the following: 49 DENVER L. REv. 609 (1973); 
Ficken, Wyandotte and its Progeny: The Quest for Environmental Protection Through the 
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 78 DICK. L. REv. 429, 440 (1973); 3 ENVT'L L. 267 
(1973); Comment, 62 KENTUCKY L.J. 211 (1973); 7 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 790 (1973). 
• Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). 
• Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, No. 72 C 1253, at 14253 (N.D. Ill. oral order delivered July 
29, 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77·2246 (7th Cir. argued May 24, 1978) (hereinafter cited as 
Oral Order with page references to the transcript prepared by the official reporter of the 
United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division-the oral order 
is contained in pages 14207 to 14260). 
• See Oral Order, supra note 3, at 14231, 14246·47. 
• The court required that the discharges contain less than five milligrams per liter of 
deoxygenating wastes (BOD) and five milligrams per liter of suspended solids. Oral Order, 
supra note 3, at 14253. 
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discharges into Lake Michigan from sources within Illinois." The 
court standards were also more stringent than those required by 
Wisconsin law. 7 
This article will examine the Supreme Court's decision that fed-
eral common law could properly be applied in Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee. S Additionally, the standards for nuisance claims based 
on federal law will be explored. Then, the focus wil turn to the 
district court decision, which actually relied on federal common law 
principles to reach the conclusion that Milwaukee would be re-
quired to meet specific effluent levels similar to those of Illinois. The 
ultimate question posed is whether the novel remedy awarded by 
the court is justified by the federal common law that served as the 
basis for the decision. 
II. USE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
Federal courts are not free to apply federal common law to any 
case that may come before them.9 As section 34 of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 provides: 
rTlhe laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treat-
ies, or Acts of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require 
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law 
in the Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply}O 
In Swift v. Tysonll the Supreme Court held that "the laws of the 
several states" contemplated by the Act did not include decisions 
of state courtS. 12 The Court held that state decisional law was not 
conclusive authority with respect to issues of nonstatutory law be-
fore a federal court; instead state decisions were considered to be 
only evidence of what the common law was. 13 Consequently, when 
suits were brought in federal courts, the courts were not bound by 
state court decisions which did not depend "upon local statutes or 
• Discharges are limited to a content exceeding neither four mg. BOD per liter nor five mg. 
suspended solids per liter. Ill. Pollution Control Bd. Rules and Regs., Ch. 3, § 404(d) (stan-
dards effective December 31, 1974). 
1 Discharges are limited to a content not exceeding an average of 30 mg. per liter of BOD 
or 30 mg. per liter of suspended solids. Wis. Admin. Code, Ch. NR, §§ 210.10(1)(a), (b) 
(standards effective July 1, 1977). 
• 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
• Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
ID The Rules of Decision Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1940). In 1948 the quoted passage 
was amended and the phrase "civil actions" replaced the phrase "trials at common law." 28 
U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). 
II 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
12 [d. at 18. 
13 [d. 
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local usages of a fixed and permanent operation."14 Thus, federal 
common law could diverge from the common law of the state in 
which the federal court sat and could develop independently of state 
law. 
In 1938, the Supreme Court reversed Swift v. Tyson in Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins. 15 The decision in Erie did not affect the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 itself, but overruled the interpretation given to the 
phrase, "laws of the several states," by the Court in Swift v. Tyson. 
As the Erie Court stated: 
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And 
whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a 
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal 
concern. There is no federal general common law. 18 
The holding of Erie did not preclude federal courts from deviating 
from state law in suits based on diversity jurisdiction, 17 but it halted 
the independent development of a general corpus of common law in 
the federal courts. 
However, despite the pronouncement against a federal general 
common law, the Court acknowledged that certain limited ques-
tions were still to be resolved by federal common law and not by 
state law. 18 In an opinion delivered on the same day as Erie and 
written by Justice Brandeis, who also wrote the majority opinion in 
Erie, the Court dealt with one of the particular substantive areas 
in which federal common law applies, the apportionment of inter-
" Id. at 18-19 . 
.. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
" Id. at 78. 
17 Diversity jurisdiction is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976), which provides, in part: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum of value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is 
between-
(1) citizens of different States; 
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign States or citizens or subjects thereof; and 
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign States or citizens or subjects 
thereof are additional parties. 
The Supreme Court has held that in certain situations, even though the Erie rule would 
require application of state law, federal courts should follow practices under federal law. E.g., 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,463-64 (1965) (service of process governed by Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure rather than by state law); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 
U.S. 525, 535-38 (1958) (affirmative federal policy favoring jury trials overrode state policy 
that the judge be the factfinder). 
IS See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 383 (1964). 
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state waters. IS The number and scope of such substantive areas 
have grown steadily. 20 
Just as no simple test exists which governs the choice between the 
use of federal and state law in situations governed by the Erie rule,21 
no pre-established formula determines whether federal common law 
will be applied in any particular case.22 Certain considerations are 
likely to invoke the use of federal common law, such as: (1) issues 
involving a dispute between states or protection of a state's sover-
eign rights;23 (2) issues related to the operation of federal statutory 
law or federal policy;24 (3) issues affecting uniformity of law in areas 
where federal law applies;25 (4) issues affecting the duties and opera-
tion of the federal government;2a (5) questions arising under mari-
time and admiralty claims;27 and (6) issues concerning international 
law.28 A court may look to only one2S or several30 of the considerations 
when it decides whether to apply federal law. However, the mere 
presence of any of the issues listed above will not require a court to 
decide a case on the basis of federal common law.31 
Federal courts may draw on several sources when fashioning fed-
eral common law. Any prior federal decisions on point should be 
given due consideration; courts may analogize from principles 
within other federal decisions, including common law created prior 
to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 32 In addition, courts may look to 
It Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (appor-
tionment of interstate waters decided on the basis of federal common law). 
• E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (commercial paper); 
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (labor 
law). 
21 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). 
22 For examples of attempts to categorize areas of law or issues appropriate for decision 
according to federal common law principles, see Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal 
Courts: Constitutional Pre-emption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024 (1967) [hereinafter referred to 
as Hill); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1512 (1969). See also Note, 
Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 MARv. L. REv. 1439, 1444-45 (1972). 
23 E.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). See, 
e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
24 E.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
21 E.g., Ivy Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). 
• E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
%I Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-11 (1953). See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, 
cl. 1. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAw or ADMIRALTY 40-45 (1957). 
21 E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See Hill, supra note 
22, at 1042-49. 
21 E.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
311 E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
31 E.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966). 
33 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943). 
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federal statutes and regulations and their underlying policies.33 Fed-
eral statutes and regulations should serve as the primary guide for 
determining federal common law because federal law, by definition, 
is at issue. Since federal statutes are the clearest source of federal 
policy, any federal statute dealing with the same general subject as 
the matter before the court should be a starting point for fashioning 
federal common law.34 State law (including state common law) and 
regulations may also aid in forming federal common law.3S State law 
may even be so persuasive as to serve as the controlling principle in 
a federal common law decision.3ft However, it is federal law rather 
than state law that is conclusive; any state law, principle or policy 
which may be used by the court is absorbed into the federal common 
law and is not an independent or distinct source of private rights.37 
Thus, federal common law retains its federal character even if state 
law principles are part of the federal law; federal common law is 
independent of state law even though state law and regulations may 
be considered in the formulation of federal common law. 
A. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee: Supreme Court Opinion 
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, the Supreme Court formally 
added nuisance law, as applied to interstate navigable waters, to the 
post-Erie list of substantive areas governed by federal common law. 
In 1972, Illinois filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in 
the United States Supreme Court, alleging that the Sewerage Com-
mission of the City of Milwaukee, and others, were discharging raw 
or inadequately treated sewage into Lake Michigan. 38 The motion 
was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1251, which grants the Supreme 
Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over "all controversies be-
tween two or more States, "38 and original, but not exclusive, juris-
diction over "all actions or proceedings by a State against the citi-
zens of another State or against aliens. "40 
33 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448,457 (1957) . 
.. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966). See also Deitrick v. Greany, 
309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940). 
31 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972); Textile Workers Union of America 
v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) . 
.. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 471 (1942) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). 
37 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) . 
.. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l) (1976) . 
.. [d. § 1251(b)(3). 
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The Court denied Illinois' motion on the grounds that political 
subdivisions of states were not "States" for the purposes of 28 
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)41 and, since Wisconsin was not a necessary de-
fendant in the dispute,42 the controversy was not under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court. The Court further held that although it did 
have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3), if Illinois 
could sue in a federal district court, the Supreme Court c~)Uld and 
would decline to exercise its original jurisdiction because an alterna-
tive federal forum was available.43 
The Supreme Court avoided the mandatory exercise of its original 
jurisdiction by holding that Illinois could sue in federal district 
court. District courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), have original 
jurisdiction over civil actions where the matter in dispute arises 
under the "laws. . . of the United States."44 The City of Milwaukee 
Court held that "laws" under this section included claims founded 
on federal common law.45 Thus, the Court was stating that the nuis-
ance claim presented a federal question which was a proper basis 
of jurisdiction for a federal district court. 
The Court's decision that federal common law was an appropriate 
basis for resolving the dispute rested on two considerations. First, 
federal common law is an appropriate means to settle disputes in 
which the sovereign rights of one or more states is at issue. 48 Second, 
in an area of law in which there is substantial federal interest and 
pervasive federal legislation and regulation, federal common law 
may govern claims not explicitly contemplated by statuteY The 
reason for using federal common law in a particular case should be 
an important factor in forming a remedy on the basis of a federal 
common law decision. 48 
1. Protection of Sovereign Rights and Interests 
Federal common law is an appropriate and necessary means to 
" Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972). 
42 [d. at 97 . 
.. [d. at 98 . 
.. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) . 
•• Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972) . 
.. [d. at 104-05. 
" [d. at 101-03 (1972). The opinion is not as explicit on this point as the opinion in Ivy 
Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968), which the City of 
Milwaukee Court quotes. 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) . 
.. For example, if the presence of conflicting sovereign rights were the reason for using 
federal common law in the first place, then the resulting federal common law remedy should 
not contravene those sovereign rights. Once the decision is made to apply federal common 
law, the reasons for raising it remain significant. 
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settle disputes between states. 48 Since no state can impose its own 
law on another state, in such situations,50 the use of state law cannot 
resolve the conflict. Thus, federal courts have settled state bound-
ary disputes independent of state law or federal stautes.51 In addi-
tion, federal common law has been implemented as a decisional 
basis for the allocation of interstate waters between states. 52 
The right of a state to be free from injury caused by another state 
is a sovereign right protected by federal common law. The Supreme 
Court, in Missouri v. Illinois,53 held that it could properly grant 
relief when the activities of one state caused injury to another state. 
Missouri complained that Illinois discharged sewage mixed with 
water from Lake Michigan through an artificial channel and ulti-
mately into the Mississippi River upstream from St. Louis. The 
complaint alleged that the discharges caused deposits in navigable 
waterways and created a health hazard for Missouri residents who 
drank or used the water. The Court denied relief for Missouri be-
cause Missouri could not satisfactorily prove the allegations, but it 
maintained that Missouri had alleged sufficient grounds for relief.54 
A year later, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 55 the Court 
granted an injunction against activities within one state that caused 
injury to another state even though the harmful activity was carried 
out by a private party and not by a state or pursuant to state 
authority. A copper works situated in Tennessee polluted the air 
with sulfurous emissions that caused harm within Georgia's borders. 
Georgia was allowed to bring suit for an injunction to prevent con-
tinued pollution. The Court explicitly stated that the state's claim 
was properly based on its sovereign rights, and that those rights 
included the right to be free from extra-territorial nuisances: 
When the States by their union made forcible abatement of outside 
nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to 
whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of mak-
ing reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-
sovereign interests .... 56 
.. E.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) . 
.. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907) . 
• , Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,110-11, n.12 (1938). 
I. E.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry 
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); 
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
53 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (demurrer overruled); 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (merits of case). 
I< Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520, 526 (1906). 
51 206 U.S. 230 (1907) . 
.. [d. at 237. Justice Holmes did not explain why he adopted the term "quasi-sovereign" 
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The decisions in Missouri v. Illinois57 and Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co. 58 demonstrate that the sovereign interests of a state 
extend beyond its property interests in boundary disputes and water 
apportionment cases. Also, the Supreme Court in Tennessee Copper 
Co. held that vindication of the sovereign rights of a single state was 
a sufficient basis for granting relief; a conflict between two states 
was not necessary for the exercise of federal judicial power. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit resur-
rected federal nuisance law as a means of interstate water pollution 
abatement in Texas v. Pankey.58 Texas v. Pankey was the first fed-
eral case after the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 80 that held 
that federal common law should be recognized as a basis for grant-
ing relief against out-of-state activities causing a nuisance within 
the complaining state. The court reversed a federal district court of 
New Mexico which had dismissed a suit to enjoin certain New Mex-
ico residents from polluting an interstate river with pesticide. Citing 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., II the opinion held that a state's 
"ecological" rights were included in the sovereign interests contem-
plated by Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 82 and that those rights 
presented a sufficient federal question to bring suit in federal dis-
trict court.13 
The Court's unanimous opinion in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee84 
drew heavily on the principles of state sovereignty considered in 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 85 Also, since Tennessee Copper Co. 
was a case involving air pollution, the former cases dealing with 
interstate water apportionment88 were invoked to demonstrate that 
states historically have had sovereign rights in interstate water. 
Therefore, the decision that federal common law is to be applied in 
situations similar to those of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee rests both 
in place of "sovereign." However, since he was making the point that states do not have all 
the powers of a sovereign (specifically, they may not wage war on another state), he may have 
used the term to clarify that while states have sovereign rights, they do not have full sovereign 
powers because they joined the United States. 
17 200 U.S. 496 (l906). 
18 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
II 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). 
II 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
'1 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
'2 Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (lOth Cir. 1971). 
II [d . 
.. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
II 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
II Specifically, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
See e.g., note 52, supra. 
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on the states' sovereign rights to be free from outside nuisance and 
on the states' traditional sovereign interests in interstate waters. 
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the reasoning of the opinion in 
Texas v. Pankey and quoted the Pankey court's conclusion that a 
state's nuisance claim should "be held to be a matter having basis 
and standard in federal common law and so directly constituting a 
question arising under the laws of the United States."87 
2. Federal Interest in the Purity of Interstate Waters 
The opinion in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee implied that there 
was another reason for the use of federal common law in the case.8S 
Justice Douglas briefly traced the history of federal interstate water 
quality legislation from the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3,1899 
to the then-current Federal Water Pollution Control Act,89 but did 
not offer a precise conclusion why the whole scheme was signifi-
cant.70 He suggested that the record of legislation manifested a 
strong federal interest in the matter and/or that federal legislation 
was so pervasive that federal courts were justified in applying fed-
eral common law in such cases. 
Courts have been especially predisposed to apply federal common 
law when activities of the federal government are at issue.71 This 
includes conflicts arising out of such governmental activities as 
making contracts,72 employing persons,73 and dealing with commer-
cial paper74 because of the strong federal interests involved. Justifi-
cation for the use of federal common law on the basis of a strong 
federal interest was most clearly stated in a footnote in the City of 
Milwaukee opinion: 
[W]here there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform 
rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of feder-
alism, we have fashioned federal common law. Certainly these same 
., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 
236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971)) . 
.. [d. at 105, n.6 (1972). "Thus, it is not only the character of the parties that requires us 
to apply federal law." 
.. [d. at 101-03. 
7. If the opinion only wishes to make the point that federal legislation does not preempt 
federal common law (id. at 104), it could have done so without the full survey of laws and 
comments such as "Congress has evinced increasing concern with the quality of the aquatic 
environment .... " [d. at 102. 
71 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See text at 
note 26, supra. 
12 Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947). 
13 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947). 
" Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
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demands are present in the pollution of a body of water such as Lake 
Michigan bounded, as it is, by four states.75 
Thus, Justice Douglas implied that federal interest in interstate 
waters reinforced the decision to apply federal common law, and 
therefore that decision did not rest solely on the need to protect the 
sovereign rights of Illinois. One indication of federal interest in in-
terstate waters is the amount of federal legislation governing those 
waters. The sketch of the federal statutory scheme may have been 
offered to demonstrate the strong federal interest in interstate wa-
ters. 
Federal courts have also fashioned federal law in cases where 
federal legislation is pervasive.7ft When federal statutory law does 
not completely preempt the operation of state law in a particular 
area, problems may still arise within "the penumbra of express 
statutory mandates. "77 Federal courts may then settle the disputes 
in conformity with the policy of the appropriate federal legislation, 78 
even when the precise remedies are not mandated by Congress.79 
The City of Milwaukee opinion did not explicitly state that the 
amount of federal legislation pertaining to water quality warranted 
the application of federal common law. However, Justice Douglas 
devoted more than a page of the opinion to outline the related 
statutes. The chronicle of legislation was not necessary merely to 
reach the conclusion that a non-statutory remedy could be granted; 
the opinion suggested that the significant amount of federallegisla-
tion might serve as a reason for using federal common law. 
Whether or not federal interest in interstate waters or the consid-
erable federal water quality legislation would each independently 
justify the use of federal common law to resolve the dispute in 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, the opinion at least implies that the 
two points considered together serve as a reason to use federal com-
mon law. 
-
III. FEDERAL NUISANCE LAW 
After the Supreme Court dismissed Illinois' motion to proceed 
TO Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105, n.6 (1972) (citations omitted). 
" E.g., Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). See 
text at notes 24 and 25, supra. 
77 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). 
But see UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 969 (1966). Both cases deal with labor law, 
the former applied federal common law and the latter held that state law should apply. 
78 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). 
" Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972). 
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under the Court's original jurisdiction, Illinois filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
The defendants challenged the court's jurisdiction and the venue of 
the suit but the court held that it had jurisdiction and that the 
venue was proper.80 Milwaukee then filed a motion to dismiss, argu-
ing that the suit was preempted by federal statute. Although the 
Supreme Court had ruled that no federal statute preempted Illinois' 
claim, it acknowledged that new statutes and regulations may 
someday preempt the field offederal common law ofnuisance.81 The 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act82 (FWPCA) was amended after 
the Supreme Court decision. However, the district court held that 
neither the amended FWPCA nor any other federal statutes 
preempted the suit.83 
A. Standards for Determining Whether a Nuisance Exists 
Once the court finally reached the merits of the case, it had to 
determine whether a public nuisance existed and what remedy 
would be appropriate if Illinois could prove that a nuisance existed. 
The common law surrounding nuisance is divided under the two 
headings of private nuisance and public nuisance.Sf A private nuis-
ance affects a determinate number of persons and is defined to be 
an interference with the use and enjoyment ofland.85 A public nuis-
ance affects citizens generally and is a wrongful interference with 
legal rights and privileges of the public88 without particular regard 
for rights in land. Cause of action for a public nuisance normally lies 
in the hands of public authorities.87 
.. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 4 ERC 1849 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1972) (memorandum 
opinion and order). 
" Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) . 
.. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251·1376 (1976) (as amended). 
Although Pub. L. No. 92·500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), enacted after the decision in Illinois v. 
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), was technically an amendment to the statutory 
scheme, it was a total revision of the prior statutory material. Thus, Pub. L. No. 92·500 
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251·1376 (1976)) will be considered as the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA). The Act was subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 95·217, 91 Stat. 
1566 (1977) and Pub. L. No. 95·576, 92 Stat. 2467 (1978). These amendments became effective 
after the district court decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 3; furthermore, 
the amendments should have no bearing on the issues discussed in this article, thus the 
citations will refer only to the text in 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251·1376 (1976). 
83 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973) . 
.. Yeager & Sullivan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 324 N.E.2d 846, 850 (Ind. App. 1975) . 
.. City of Newport News v. Hertzler, 216 Va. 587, 592, 221 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1976). Yeager 
& Sullivan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 324 N.E.2d 846, 850 (Ind. App. 1975) . 
.. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 458·59, 347 A.2d 290, 303 (1975). 
" However, if a private party can show some special damage to her/him that is not shared 
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In any action concerning a public or private nuisance, any alleged 
interference must be found to be substantial and unreasonable to 
be a nuisance;88 mere invasion of a legal interest alone is not ade-
quate ground for relief. 89 In determining whether a nuisance exists 
a court will balance the equities involved in each particular case. 
In addition, the relief afforded will be largely determined at the 
discretion of the court.90 In making a determination wh~ther the 
interference is unreasonable courts consider such elements as locale 
or character of the neighborhood, the social utility of the activity 
causing the interference, the gravity of the harm caused or threat-
ened91 and the hardship which may result from any judgment. 92 
Thus, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee the district court had to 
weigh all the elements related to the alleged pollution of Illinois' 
waters by Milwaukee. In addition, since Illinois alleged nuisance 
under federal law, the court had to decide what standard of proof 
Illinois would have to meet to demonstrate that the interference was 
unreasonable. In civil actions in both state and federal court, plain-
tiffs usually must meet a standard of proof by a preponderance of 
evidence. 93 The evolution of cases involving federal nuisance law 
leaves some doubt about the proper standard in federal courts. 
B. Standard of Proof in Federal Courts 
In Missouri v. Illinois,94 which has dominated federal nuisance 
law, the Supreme Court denied reliefto Missouri because the allega-
tions were not "clearly and fully proved. "95 This high standard, 
which was required before the Court would enjoin the activities of 
a state, created a serious burden for any future complainants.9s In 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper CO.97 the defendant was a private 
by the general public then she/he may have relief against a public nuisance. Smejkal v. 
Empire Lite-Rock, Inc., 274 Or. 571, 574, 547 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1976); City of Monticello v. 
Rankin, 521 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Ky. 1975) . 
.. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter, 297 S.W.2d 146, 152 (Ky. 1965) . 
.. See McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apts. Ltd., 25 Ariz. App. 312, _, 543 P.2d 150, 152 
(1975) . 
.. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972). 
II Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1123 (7th Cir. 1976) (as 
amended); Marshall v. Consumer's Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 265, 237 N.W.2d 266, 283 
(1975). 
tz McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apts. Ltd., 25 Ariz. App. 312, _,543 P.2d 150, 152 (1975). 
13 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1019 (1964) (cases collected in n.18) . 
•• 200 U.S. 496, 526 (1906). 
" [d. at 521. 
.. [d.; Ohio v. Wyandotte Chern. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 501 (1971); see, e.g., New York v. 
New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921). 
" 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
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party, not a state. There the Court allowed an injunction after proof 
of the allegations by a preponderance of evidence.ls However, Jus-
tice Holmes, who wrote for the majority in both cases, maintained 
that Georgia's proof by a preponderance of evidence satisfied the 
requirements of Missouri v. Illinois. II Thus it is unclear whether the 
standard of "by a preponderance of evidence" is applicable in all 
federal nuisance cases, or whether two different standards, based on 
whether the defendant is a private individual or a state, exist. 
The caution exercised by the Court in Missouri v. Illinois is war-
ranted when a complaining party seeks to enjoin the activities of a 
state. However, when the defendant is a private party, the defen-
dant has no rights as a sovereign and such a burdensome standard 
of proof is unwarranted. In suits against a private individual the 
same standard of proof as in civil suits between private parties, 
preponderance of evidence, should be applied. 
The history of the federal nuisance cases supports the position 
that proof by a preponderance of evidence is sufficient when the 
defendant is not a state. Justice Holmes devoted three pages of his 
nine page opinion in Missouri v. Illinois to the problem of enjoining 
the activities of the defendant state,l00 but he did not seem to ques-
tion the power of the Court to enjoin the private defendant in his 
opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 101 He never had to con-
sider any sovereign interests of the defendant in the latter case. 
Subsequent nuisance decisions have denied relief to states suing 
other states, but have granted injunctions when states sued private 
parties situated in other states,102 thereby implying that a lesser 
standard of proof is warranted in the latter cases. 
Justice Holmes' statement in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 
that proof by a preponderance of evidence satisfied the require-
ments of Missouri v. Illinois may merely mean that, in that case, 
Georgia had made a proper showing of harm. It is submitted that a 
proper showing of harm varies with the standard of proof. Missouri 
.R [d. at 238 . 
.. A subsequent Supreme Court decision, which involved a state suing another state, inter-
preted Missouri v. Illinois as requiring proof by "clear and convincing evidence." New York 
v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). See also North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 
374 (1923). Not all cases have adopted the "clear and convincing" language, but they have 
required a similar high standard. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 326 U.S. 589, 608 (1945) . 
• 00 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 518-21 (1906). 
'0. 206 U.S. 230, 237-39 (1907) . 
• 82 Compare New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) with New Jersey v. City of New 
York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) and Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). 
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failed to convince the court because the standard of proof was so 
demanding. Georgia had the less demanding standard of proof by a 
preponderance of evidence and \fas thus able to satisfy the require-
ment of a proper showing of harm. 
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee the district court found that that 
sewage discharged by Milwaukee created a nuisance, and that Illi-
nois had proven its case by "clear and convincing" eviden~e.lo3 Ac- -
cording to the court itself, satisfaction of the higher standard of 
proof was not necessary since Milwaukee's actions were not consid-
ered actions by a statel04 and, therefore, proof by a preponderance 
of evidence would have sufficed to establish the existence of a nuis-
ance. IOI However, since the court found that Illinois met the more 
demanding standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence, the 
validity of the court's finding does not depend on any characteriza-
tion of the defendant. Even if Wisconsin were deemed to be a party 
to the action the court could still grant relief. 
IV. ApPROPRIATENESS OF THE DISTRICT COURT REMEDY 
Once the district court made a finding that Milwaukee created a 
nuisance, attention then turned to what remedy would be fashioned. 
Although the Supreme Court instructed that the "informed judg-
ment of the chancellor" would largely govern the results in such 
cases, I" the broad equity powers of the court are not without bound. 
The Supreme Court in Missouri v. Illinois recognized that a court 
must have some guidelines for its decisions: 
But of course, the fact that this court must decide does not mean that 
it takes the place of a legislature. Some principles it must have power 
to declare. For instance, when a dispute arises about boundaries, this 
court must determine the line, and in doing so must be governed by 
rules explicitly or implicitly recognized. lo7 
The "judgment of the chancellor" may largely determine the out-
come, but the outcome should at least be consistent with federal 
common law principles. 
A. District Court Remedy 
The court established standards for Milwaukee's sewage dis-
III Oral Order, supra note 3, at 14231. See note 99, supra. 
114 rd. at 14209. 
III rd. at 14253. 
III Dlinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1972). 
117 Mi880Uri v. Dlinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519-20 (1906). 
1978] FEDERAL NUISANCE ACTIONS 307 
charge, requiring Milwaukee to achieve levels not to exceed five 
milligrams per liter of deoxygenating wastes (BOD) and five milli-
grams per liter of suspended solids. 108 Illinois limits the content of 
discharges to four milligrams of BOD and five milligrams of sus-
pended solids per liter of liquid. IOU Wisconsin has less stringent stan-
dards, allowing thirty milligrams per liter of BODIIO and thirty milli-
grams per liter of suspended solidslll for wastewater discharged into 
Lake Michigan. The Wisconsin standards are similar to the applica-
ble federal standards established by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) pursuant to FWPCA.1I2 Thus the court standards 
were more stringent than the Wisconsin and federal standards, and 
almost identical to the standards established by Illinois. 
B. Guidelines for Fashioning a Remedy under Federal Common 
Law 
By setting specific effluent standards, the district court deviated 
from a normal judicial course into the traditional province of legisla-
tures and agencies. 1I3 Although the court may exercise its discretion 
in an equity suit, the remedy should be warranted by some principle 
found in federal common law. 114 
1. Judicial Guidelines 
Although the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of Illinois' 
complaint, the opinion mentioned several principles that are rele-
vant to a choice of a remedy under federal common law. The over-
riding principle expressed by the Court in Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee was that such suits would rely on the equity powers of 
the federal courtsll5 and thus "the informed judgment of the chan-
cellor will largely govern."118 Two important consequences follow 
from such a view. First, since no fixed rules govern the choice of a 
... Oral Order, supra note 3, at 14253 . 
• 11 See note 6, supra. 
III See note 7, supra . 
• 11 Id. 
III See 40 C.F.R. § 133 (1976). 
113 For a discussion that the use of federal common law is improper because the court must 
usurp legislative and administrative powers, see Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate 
Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1972). See also Note, The Role of Courts in Technology 
Assessment, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 861 (1970). 
114 See text at note 107, supra. 
III Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1972). 
III Id. 
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remedy, IJ7 the remedy is not confined to those remedies explicit in 
statutory provisions. 1I8 Second, the results will depend on the facts 
peculiar to the particular case before the court.1t9 
The Supreme Court stated that federal legislation may provide 
useful guidelines120 and that courts could also consider state stan-
dards in reaching a decision. 121 The consideration of state standards 
in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee is particularly important because 
the Court decided that a state could assert a claim based on its 
sovereign rights: "[AJ State with high water-quality standards 
may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not be 
compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neigh-
bor."122 Although state law and regulations may be persuasive, fed-
eral law ultimately controls.123 Any state law, principle, or policy 
which may be used is absorbed into federal law and is not an inde-
pendent or distinct source of rights124 because federal common law 
is the basis for the decision. 
The district court could also look to other federal decisions for 
relevant principles, including federal common law created prior to 
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 125 However, the scope of federal nuis-
ance law has not been fully explored. 128 Thus other federal cases do 
not provide much specific guidance for fashioning remedies. 
The court could disregard any compliance by Milwaukee with 
sta te and federal standards on the basis of the holding of New Jersey 
v. City of New York. 127 There the Supreme Court held that compli-
117 [d. 
118 [d. at 103-04. 
II. See id. at 106. 
120 [d. at 103, n.5. 
IZI [d. at 107. See also Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 
U.S. 448, 457 (1957). 
IZZ lllinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). 
123 [d. 
IZI Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). 
121 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943). 
121 Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Virginia v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 562 
(E.D. Va. 1976). Lower courts have expreBBly or impliedly limited common law actions to 
situations involving interstate waters. [d. Cases cited in Board of Supervisors include: Re-
serve Mine [sic) Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975); Stream Pollution Control 
Bd. oflndiana v. U.S. Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036,1040 (7th Cir. 1975); Michie v. Great Lakes 
Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 216 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Committee for the Consideration 
of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1976) (limited to 
controversies to vindicate a state's rights). Such limitations do not affect the district court 
considerations in lllinois v. City of Milwaukee. 
IZ1 283 U.S. 473 (1931). But see Committee for the Consideration ofthe Jones Falls Sewage 
System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1976) (where there is no claim of vindication 
of state rights or interstate effects, no federal common law relief awarded if discharges are in 
compliance with federal statutes and regulations). 
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ance with federal statutes did not bar injunctive relief in a nuisance 
action. New York dumped garbage into the ocean which later in-
vaded New Jersey waters and washed ashore on New Jersey 
beaches. The disposal itself did not take place in New Jersey waters. 
The Supreme Court awarded the injunction despite the fact that 
New York was in compliance with permits issued by the harbor 
supervisor pursuant to the Act of June 29, 1888. 128 The Court held 
that New Jersey was entitled to abatement because the activity by 
New York City created a nuisance and relief was granted even 
though the activity was sanctioned by a federal statute. 129 Thus both 
state and federal law may allow an activity, yet a court may order 
the practice halted if it creates a nuisance. 
But New Jersey v. City of New York, 130 and all of the other pre-
Erie federal nuisance cases previously cited that reached the issue 
of a remedy, spoke only in terms of injunction, not regulation by the 
court. 131 No direct precedent from prior cases supports the court's 
remedy of imposing standards similar to Illinois' effluent standards 
on Milwaukee. However, other sources of federal common law may 
justify the remedy. 
2. Policy of Federal Legislation 
If the Supreme Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee l32 relied on 
the pervasiveness of federal water quality legislation as a reason for 
its decision that federal common law was applicable, then the statu-
tory policy should be the primary source for fashioning a remedy. 
Even if the statutory scheme is not a reason for applying federal 
common law, federal statutes are the clearest source of federal pol-
icy and any federal statute that deals with the same subject should 
be a starting point for federal common law. 133 The range of judicial 
inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem be-
fore the courtl34 and while the federal statutes will not mark the 
128 New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 477 (1931). 
121 [d. at 482-83. A lawful activity may be conducted so as to amount to a nuisance. E.g., 
Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 518 F.2d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1975). 
138 283 U.S. 473 (1931). 
131 The post-Erie case of Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) which is closely 
analogous to Illinois v. City of Milwaukee and which relied on the new "specialized federal 
common law" as a basis for decision, also spoke only in terms of injunction. 
132 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
133 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966). See also Deitrick v. Greany, 
309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940). 
134 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). 
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bounds of common law remedies,135 the court-created remedies 
should be compatible with, and not in contravention of, the related 
statutes. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)136 is the most 
comprehensive statement of federal policy with respect to the con-
trol of water pollution. The FWPCA, which applies to Lake Michi-
gan because the lake is a navigable interstate body of water, at-
tempts to establish a comprehensive scheme for reducing pollution, 
preventing further pollution and improving the quality of the na-
tion's navigable waters.137 At the same time the Act attempts to 
recognize and preserve the primary rights and responsibilities of the 
states to control land and water development and use. 13S Conse-
quently, each state may adopt its own water quality standards 
under the Act. 139 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-
views the proposed standards from each state before they are ap-
proved under FWPCA.140 The Act itself does not set any specific 
standards for interstate waters, but if a state fails to adopt its own 
standards for interstate waters, or if EPA finds that a state's pro-
posed standards are inconsistellt with FWPCA, the EPA adminis-
trator may establish the standards. \41 The Act encourages interstate 
cooperation and uniform laws relating to water quality maintenance 
and improvement,142 but such uniformity has not yet been accom-
plished. 
The overriding objective of the Act is to "restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of the nation's wa-
ters.143 The objective calls for the elimination of polluting discharges 
into navigable waters.144 The standards imposed by the court in 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee l45 force Milwaukee closer to the Act's 
objective of pollution elimination because they are stricter than the 
'31 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & 
Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Vt. 1972). 
,31 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251·1376 (1976). See note 82, supra. 
'37 E.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1252(a) (1976); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 
(1975); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 668 (M.D. Fla. 1974). 
'38 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 30 Ill. App.3d 360, 332 N.E.2d 426, 432 (1975). 
'3' 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1976). See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1·2 (1972), reprinted 
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668,3669 . 
... 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1976). 
'" [d . 
.. 2 [d. § 1253(a) . 
.. 3 [d. § 1251(a). 
'" [d.; American Frozen Food Inst. V. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
... Oral Order, supra note 3, at 14253. 
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Wisconsin standards. Although the court's remedy promotes 
FWPCA policy in this respect, Congress has chosen, "to recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of 
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution .... "148 Thus, if 
the statutory language implies that Wisconsin has a right to achieve 
the objective at a slower rate than any other state, the court's rem-
edy seems to violate this right and, consequently, is in contraven-
tion of federal policy. The Act also explicitly excepts wastes from 
municipal treatment plants from its general language and takes a 
less demanding stance with regard to such pollution. 147 The special 
consideration given to municipal plants does not ·prevent a finding 
of a public nuisance, but it may imply that Congress intended that 
the Act not be as strictly enforced with respect to such plants. If this 
is true, the imposition of stricter standards by the court in City of 
Milwaukee than those promulgated pursuant to FWPCA148 may be 
contrary to the policy of the Act. 
On the other hand, the Act preserves the authority of the states 
to adopt standards which are more stringent than those already in 
existence. 149 Such provisions encourage a state's efforts to achieve 
the goal of eliminating polluting discharges by gradually enacting 
stricter effluent standards. Unless states gradually adopt stricter 
water quality controls,150 the effective standard will remain at the 
level of the least demanding state standard and no progress will be 
made toward the Act's objective. In addition, achieving reduction 
of pollutants in discharges involves greater state and municipal ex-
penditures and the risk that industries may leave the state rather 
than incur the additional expenses of compliance. States may not 
make such sacrifices in order to achieve cleaner water if the benefits 
of having cleaner water are diminished or erased by pollution from 
other states which have less restrictive standards. Therefore the 
rights of the states with more stringent standards should be pro-
tected at least to the extent that the quality of the water associated 
with such standards is preserved. Under this interpretation, the 
district court's remedy in City of Milwaukee is consistent with fed-
eral policy . 
... 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976). 
'41 [d. §§ 1311(a), 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(d)(1) (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 133 (1976). 
'48 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d)(1) (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 133 (1976). 
'"~ E.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1317(b)(4), 1370 (1976); see also Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 301 (N.D. TIl. 1973). 
, .. Cf. Stream Pollution Control Bd. of Indiana v. U.S. Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036, 1043 
(7th Cir. 1975) (Congress intended a step-by-step improvement in quality of effluent dis-
charge). 
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Although the Act defers to state sovereign rights, the statute di-
rects the states to "prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution."151 
Therefore a wrongdoer should not be allowed to hide behind a claim 
of such rights when doing so would undermine the efforts of another 
state to exercise its rights to reduce pollution in compliance with 
FWPCA objectives. 152 
While support for the district court remedy can be gleaned from 
the FWPCA, the Act as a whole lends equivocal support at best. 
Certain provisions in the statute do not support the remedy. In 
particular, municipal treatment plants are given special considera-
tion and exemptions from certain provisions in the statute. 153 Also, 
EPA has promulgated national regulations for sewage plants, and 
the Wisconsin regulations conform to the EPA standards. 154 Finally, 
responsibility for establishing effluent standards rests first with the 
states. Such contrary provisions do not forbid the remedy, but the 
support provided by the Act alone is not clear enough to justify 
setting specific standards. 
C. Justification for the Remedy 
A remedy that imposes court-created standards on Milwaukee 
that are similar to the stricter Illinois standards cannot be justified 
on the ground that Illinois is entitled to govern the interstate water 
within its boundaries. Illinois is only entitled to be free from· an 
outside nuisance. 155 Nor can the standards be imposed because they 
promote federal statutory policy since FWPCA policy does not 
clearly support such a remedy. Imposing the standards merely be-
cause they are more desirable would be a bold usurpation of legisla-
tive and administrative functions. 
The district court did not explain the rationale behind its decision 
to impose specific numerical limitations on Milwaukee's discharges. 
However, the standards would seem to be justified for either of two 
reasons: 
1. The standards represented the most restrictive levels that 
were technically feasible. 
'51 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976). 
15' See Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 
F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976). 
'" See note 147, supra. 
, •• See text at note 7, supra. But compliance with federal provisions does not immunize 
the activity from nuisance actions. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931). 
... See note 39, supra. 
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2. The standards represented the least restrictive levels which 
would achieve satisfactory abatement of the nuisance. 
The first reason for imposing the standards takes the same approach 
as an injunction: insofar as it is possible, the activity (or the objec-
tionable results of the activity) should be halted. 158 The second rea-
son is simply directed at the abatement of the nuisance: only the 
degree that reaches the level of nuisance should be forbidden and 
any activity which does not reach that level should be allowed. 
1. Most Restrictive Standards that are Technically Possible 
The first approach requires Milwaukee to meet the most restric-
tive standards possible. The decision must rest on a finding that any 
discharge would amount to a nuisance, but equitable considerations 
such as the cost and availability of alternatives and the social utility 
of the activity157 prevent an absolute injunction. This principle can 
be found in FWPCA which requires the application of the "best 
practical technology" to be used in eliminating pollution in certain 
instances. 158 The objective of FWPCA is to eliminate all polluting 
discharges into navigable waters,159 but since Congress realized that 
all pollution could not be immediately eliminated given the current 
needs of society and present technology, all that is often required is 
the use of the "best practical technology." 
2. Least Restrictive Measure for Achieving Abatement 
The second alternative requires a finding by the court that any 
discharge by Milwaukee containing levels greater than five milli-
grams of BOD and five milligrams of suspended solids per liter 
would create a nuisance. This alternative is more likely since a 
finding that any discharge amounts to a nuisance neglects the re-
quirement that a public nuisance be an unreasonable interference 
with the rights and interests of the public. The district court quoted 
a passage from a case that stipulated that waters cannot be kept 
completely pure in populated areas,180 which implied that some pol-
lution was reasonably to be expected. 
, .. See Oral Order, supra note 3, at 14254. 
'51 See, e.g., McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apts., Ltd., 25 Ariz. App. 312, _,543 P.2d 150, 
152 (1975) . 
.. " E.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281(b), 1311(b), 1316(a)(l) (1976) . 
... See note 128, supra. 
18' Oral Order, supra note 3, at 14242-43; the case is Barrett v. Mt. Greenwood Cemetery 
Assn., 159 Ill. 385, 390, 42 N.E. 891, 892 (1896). 
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Any degree of pollution below a level that would create a nuisance 
may still be undesirable, but should not be subject to further abate-
ment by order of the court. Even if Milwaukee could reduce pollu-
tion far below the nuisance level, the court should only require that 
a level just below nuisance level be attained. 
Under either of the latter two alternatives the standards would 
not be applied merely because they approximate the Illinois stan-
dards. The Illinois standards thus assume their proper role as a 
source for federal common law-they are persuasive, but not con-
trolling. The Illinois standards may serve as a model for the court 
standards because they represent a feasible standard economically 
and technically, or because they provide evidence in a determina-
tion of what levels of contaminants will create a nuisance. The 
Illinois standards themselves are irrelevant to the rulings of law 
because the court's standards are a product of findings of fact. A 
different finding of fact may have resulted in standards dissimilar 
to the Illinois standards, with these dissimilar standards then being 
imposed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By approving Texas v. Pankey!8! and ruling that pollution of a 
state's waters by a foreign source is a matter of federal law, the 
Supreme Court revived the pre-Erie principles of federal nuisance 
law. The decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee also updated 
federal nuisance law because the Court held that not only could a 
suit be brought in federal court on the basis of a state's sovereign 
interest in the integrity of its interstate waters, but that the federal 
interest in the quality of interstate waters and the substantial 
amount of federal water quality legislation support the use of federal 
common law in such situations. 
The district court's ruling is consistent with federal common law 
principles if the court's standards are seen as findings of fact aimed 
only at limiting the activities which created the nuisance. The dis-
trict court held that the existence of a nuisance had been proven by 
clear and convincing evidence and that the nuisance had to be 
abated. Such a holding protects Illinois' sovereign rights not to be 
subjected to outside nuisance. Any sovereign rights that conceivably 
exist on the part of Wisconsin are not prejudiced because the hold-
ing merely states that a nuisance shall not be created; the ruling 
III 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). 
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only affects a tortfeasor. Since Illinois met the more demanding 
standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence, the district 
court remedy would also be effective against Wisconsin, if neces-
sary. Finally, the objective of the FWPCA is promoted to the extent 
that pollution amounting to a nuisance is eliminated while the other 
provisions of the Act are not contravened. Thus the district court 
decision is compatible with the reasons for using federal common 
law and its remedy follows from the Supreme Court guidelines and 
the general principles of federal common law. 
